ABSTRACT Existing algorithms experience difficulty resisting additive and subtractive attacks because the embedded watermarks are independent of the carrier programs. A dynamic software watermarking algorithm based on exception handling is proposed in this paper. The algorithm considers the fact that exception handling, which is difficult to remove, commonly exists in the programs to ensure the normal program operation. First, an exception type table is constructed, and the binary watermark to be embedded is mapped to a sequence of exception types by scrambling encoding. Second, corresponding trigger conditions and exception handlers are constructed, and watermark embeddable points are acquired in execution paths under secret inputs. Finally, the code segment of the constructed trigger conditions and exception handlers are inserted into the program with several meticulously designed identifiers. For watermark extraction, the triggered exception types can be obtained with the identifiers by executing the watermarked executable program under secret inputs. The mapping relationship between the exception type and watermark is utilized to decode the binary watermark. The algorithm analysis and experimental results show that the proposed algorithm can embed a watermark in the source code and extract it in an executable program. The algorithm demonstrates good performance against additive and subtractive attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Software piracy is a serious challenge for the current computer software industry. The 2016 Global PC Software Piracy Research Report released by Business Software Alliance (BSA) pointed out that the global software piracy rate was as high as 39% in 2015, and the financial loss was approximately $52.2 billion [1] . As a software copyright protection technology, software watermarking can embed author, publisher, owner, user, and other information in the software to identify owners and illegal communicators. It is one of the main methods of software copyright protection at present.
Software watermarking can be classified as static or dynamic depending on the occasion of watermark embedding and extraction [2] . The carrier program is considered a static object in the static watermarking, and the watermark is embedded into the static data or code; examples include code replacement [3] , basic block reordering [4] , register allocation [5] , opacity predicate [6] , graph coding [7] , and Java method name encoding [8] watermarking algorithms and impeding Android application repackaging [9] . These watermarking methods are widely used due to their flexibility in watermark generation and simple implementation. However, the watermark is embedded directly into the code or data of the software as static information. Therefore, the watermark is easy to discover and remove. Meanwhile, the program is considered as a dynamic object in dynamic software watermarking, and the watermark is embedded in the middle state of dynamic execution. This feature maximizes the ''performability'' of the software. Dynamic software watermarking, which is more robust than static watermarking, is the focus of the current research. Dynamic watermarking has three major types. The first one is Easter egg watermarking [10] - [12] , which can visually display the watermark information with the secret input. The second type is data structure watermarking [13] , which includes K-number coding [14] , permutation coding [15] , and PPCT coding dynamic graph watermarking algorithms [16] . These methods extract the embedded watermark from the stack data structure during program execution. Another example is operation status watermarking [17] , such as return-oriented programming-based [18] , buffer overflow-based [2] , and control flow obfuscation-based watermarking algorithms [19] . The return-oriented programming-based watermarking algorithm decomposes a watermark and spreads it in the different parts of the program. The buffer overflow-based watermarking algorithm requires buffer overflow vulnerability in the program and extracts the watermark by triggering buffer overflow with special inputs. The control flow obfuscation-based watermarking algorithm embeds the watermark into a neural network module, which is also used to confuse the program's control flow.
These dynamic watermarking algorithms implement watermarking embedding and extraction on the basis of program execution. They are proven to possess better concealment and robustness than other types of algorithms. However, the carrier program and watermark are relatively independent in most of these methods, which makes the watermark weak against additive and subtractive attacks. To address this issue, we propose the exception handlingbased dynamic software watermarking, which possesses high imperceptibility and strong anti-attack capability. The algorithm considers the fact that exception handling, which is hard to be removed, commonly exists in programs to ensure normal program operation. First, an exception-type table is constructed, and the binary watermark to be embedded is mapped to a sequence of exception types by scrambling encoding. Second, corresponding trigger conditions and exception handlers are constructed, and the watermark embeddable points are acquired in execution paths under secret inputs. Lastly, the code segment of the constructed trigger conditions and the exception handlers is inserted into the program with several carefully designed identifiers. For watermark extraction, the triggered exception types can be obtained according to the identifiers by executing the watermarked executable program under secret inputs. The mapping relationship between the exception type and watermark is used to decode the binary watermark. The algorithm encodes the watermark as an exception type sequence that is embedded closely in combination with the source code and can be directly extracted from executable codes. As a result, the concealment and robustness of the watermark present a significant increase.
II. EXECEPTION HANDLING DYNAMIC WATERMARKING ALGORITHM

A. ALGORITHM FRAMEWORK
The proposed watermarking algorithm includes watermark generation, embedding, and extraction processes. The algorithm framework is shown in Figure 1 . The watermark is generated by encoding original watermark W as an exception type sequence with given exception-type set E and watermark generation key Kg. The watermark is embedded by inserting the exception handling sequence in the source code of target program P with the embedding key (several secret inputs of the program). Watermark extraction can be directly performed during the dynamic execution of the program. We execute the program with the extraction key, monitor the exceptions triggered by the program, and obtain the embedded exception type sequence. Then, watermark W can be restored with watermark generation key Kg.
B. WATERMARK GENERATION
Watermark W is assumed to be an l-bit binary sequence, and given exception type set E = {e 0 , e 1 , . . . , e n−1 }. The aim of watermark generation is to encode watermark W as an exception type sequence E w = (e w 0 , e w 1 , · · · , e w s−1 ) with the key Kg. 2) Exception type set E = {e 0 , e 1 , . . . , e n−1 is scrambled by the key Kg, and a sequenceẼ = (ẽ 0 ,ẽ 1 , . . . ,ẽ n−1 ) is obtained,
3) Exception type sequence E w = (e w 0 , e w 1 , · · · , e w s−1 ) is generated byW = (w 0 ,w 1 , · · · ,w s−1 ), where e w i =ẽw i and
C. WATERMARK EMBEDDING
We let P be the original source program. We select an acceptable input sequence = (I 0 , I 1 , · · · , I r−1 ) as the watermark embedding key, embed the exception type sequence E w in P, and obtain the watermarked program P . The detailed steps are as follows.
1) Execute P under debug mode with each input I i (i = 0, 1, . . . , r − 1) of and denote the corresponding execution path as T = {t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t r−1 .
2) For any execution sequence t i in T, extract all the variables of t i to form the set S i = s i,0 , s i,1 , . . . , s i,h i −1 , whose types are denoted as V S i = {v Embed the exception types on the embedding points. For simplicity, we denote the embedding point ass. According to number i, j of exception type e w i,j and the selected magic number R, generate the exception handling embedded identifier f by using (1), which is utilized to control the exception handling process, and mark the serial number of the embedded exception type while extracting the watermark.
The pseudo code of the embedding process of e w i,j is as follows.
Note: Predicates(f ) is designed by using the generated embedded identifier f . If f is calculated by (1), the value of predicates(f ) will be true, and the exception handling code will be executed to restore the value of variables in the original program. Otherwise,
i,j cannot be executed correctly, and the program will execute incorrectly.
Modify the original program exception handling. Modify the exception handlers in the original program. Calculate the identifier as for each exception handler as follows:
where R is a random number. The pseudo code of the modified exception handler is as follows.
The watermarked program P is obtained through these steps.
D. WATERMARK EXTRACTION
Watermark extraction uses the key = (I 0 , I 1 , · · · , I r−1 ). The elements in are inputted individually to trigger all the exception type sequences E P = (e P ,0 , e P ,1 , . . . , e P ,θ −1 ) of the watermarked program P and to findF = f 0 ,f 1 , . . . ,f θ−1 (f i is f in (1) or f in (2)) corresponding to E P . Watermark W is restored with the key Kg andF. The detailed steps are as follows.
1) Extract all exception type sequences E P = (e P ,0 , e P ,1 , . . . , e P ,θ −1 ) andF = f 0 ,f 1 , . . . ,f θ −1 corresponding to E P in P via extraction secret key . If nof i exists, setf i to zero.
2) Scramble the exception type set E = {e 0 , e 1 , . . . , e n−1 by secret key Kg to obtain the sequenceẼ = (ẽ 0 ,ẽ 1 , . . . ,ẽ n−1 ), whereẽ i ∈ E, and ∀i = j,ẽ i =ẽ j i, j = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1.
3) Decode eachf i inF = f 0 ,f 1 , . . . ,f θ−1 as follows:
If ϕ i is similar to the selected magic number R(R in (1)), then e P ,i is the embedded watermark, and σ i and ω i are the execution sequence number and embedding number of e P ,i , respectively. Calculate the index of e P ,i iñ E = (ẽ 0 ,ẽ 1 , . . . ,ẽ n−1 ) denoted as q iẽq i = e P ,i . Calculate l i = σ i × r + ω i . Supposing that s elements exist inF to satisfy the condition of
4) Calculate Q and L to extract watermark W = (w 0 ,w 1 , . . . ,w s−1 ),w i = q l i .
III. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
The purpose of attacking the watermarked program is to disable the software watermark to be extracted or identified.
In view of the characteristics of the proposed watermarking algorithm, we assume four possible attacks, namely, code reordering, removal, additive, and attack against f . The resistance of the proposed watermarking algorithm against these attacks is analyzed.
Anti-code reordering attack. Code reordering aims to disrupt the original structure without changing the program semantics and rearrange the basic blocks of the program. Under this type of attack, the execution order of the embedded exception handling may be changed. However, in the process of embedding the exception handling, the proposed algorithm identifies the execution sequence of the exception and the position in the execution sequence, namely, exception number i and j. Thus, even when the order of the exception handling changes, the watermark component can still be extracted correctly by the extracted identifier and the watermark.
Anti-subtractive attack. The algorithm embeds the watermark in the exception handling of the program and ensures consistency between the embedded exception handling and the original exception handling of the program, thus making it difficult for attackers to locate the embedded watermark position. Moreover, under the premise of failing to fully analyze the program semantics, exception handling is difficult to be removed, which further enhances the robustness of the embedded exception handling and improves the capability of resisting subtractive attacks.
Anti-additive attack. When adding exception handling to the program, the proposed algorithm adds an identifier f to exception handling and uses the identifier to determine whether the triggered exception handling is embedded. Meanwhile, the identifier is included in the exception handling after being encrypted by the key. Therefore, if attackers add exception handling in the watermarked program to affect the normal extraction of the watermark, only when the attackers manage to break the f encryption and the key, they can include the correct magic number R into the added exception handling. Otherwise, during the extraction process, the exception is regarded as an original exception handling and will not affect the embedded exception handling sequence. Therefore, the watermark can still be extracted correctly.
Anti-identification f attack. By constructing the predicate code, the algorithm adds identification f into the process of exception handling, which makes it difficult for attackers to locate identification f under the absence of the source code and without sufficient program details. Even if identification f can be located, the deletion or modification of f may lead to an abnormal value of predicates (f ). Thus, exception handling cannot run correctly and restore the variables.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
The validity of this algorithm is substantiated by several simulation cases, and specific implementation procedures are introduced. Accordingly, the influence of embedding on the program size and executive event is assessed. The results show that the watermark scheme possesses superior robustness when using relative tools.
A. SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION
We select eight objective programs for experiments from the website CodeProject. 1 These eight programs are CompressDemo, MDIFlickDemo, CryptoEncry-ption, MyFirstProject, ExtendedBitmap, WinMgr, FileDigest, and CarCrash, which belong to different categories of the website, namely, Algorithms, Bugs, Cryptography, General, Graphics, Localization, Security, and Thread, respectively. The embedded watermarks are 32-, 64-, 128-, 256-, 512-, and 1024-bit binary sequences. The given exception type set E with a size of 8 is shown in Table 1 , and each exception type can represent a 3-bit watermark fragment. Without loss of generality, the corresponding relationship (Table 2 ) between the scrambled except-ion types and the watermark fragments is generated during watermark generation stage. According to the embedding algorithm, we construct exception handling, insert them into the embedding points, obtaining the watermarked programs.
B. OVERHEAD VERIFICATION
After embedding the watermark, the embedding overhead of the program is evaluated mainly from the increase in file size and execution time. The experiments are conducted in a system environment with Intel Core I5 CPU, 4G of RAM, and Windows 10 operating system. Tables 3 to 10 show the increase of the size of the eight watermarked program These tables show that as the watermark length increases, the size of the program shows a trend of linear growth. So if the watermark information embedded in any program is smaller, the increase of the size of the program will be smaller accordingly, and the concealment is better as well. The reason is that a relationship exists between watermark length l and number of exception handling s, s = l m , where 2 m is the size of the given exception type set E. Therefore, when watermark length l is constant, the larger the set E is, the more bits can be represented by one exception type. The generated exception type sequence to be inserted into program is also short. In this condition, the increase of the size of the watermarked program is small.
The measurement of program execution time is directly related to the program's input and execution path. Therefore, to evaluate the watermarked program execution time objectively, two different inputs are selected to measure the execution time of each of the eight programs. One of the inputs indicates the execution path with the watermark embedded, and the other indicates the execution path without the watermark. To reduce the interference of the operating system, memory, and other environments on program execution time, we run the programs 20 times with each input and calculate the average time.
The experiment results show that six of the eight watermarked programs do not have a large difference from the original ones in terms of execution time. For the other two encryption programs, namely, CryptoEncryption and compression program CompressDemo, the execution time of the watermarked program is obviously increased compared with the original ones. According to the analysis, a large number of loops exist in these two programs. If the watermarks are embedded in these loops, large quantities of exception handling will be executed, resulting in a significant increase of program execution time. The increase of the execution time of the watermarked CryptoEncryption and CompressDemo with different input sizes are shown in Figures 2 and 3 , respectively. Figure 2 shows the increase in encryption time for data of 14, 23, 31, and 48 KB after the watermarks of different sizes are embedded in CryptoEncryption. Figure 3 shows the increase of compression time for data of 536, 950, 1.23, and 7.26 MB after the watermarks of different sizes are embedded in CompressDemo. As the input size increases, the watermarked program execution time also increases. When a 1024-bit watermark is embedded (i.e., embedded in the program 342 exception handling), the largest increase of program execution time is attained. The main reason is that as the input size increases, the number of program loops also increases, and the embedded exception is repeatedly triggered. Tables 11 and 12 show the relationship between the increase in watermarked program execution time and trigger counter of exceptions when the 1024-bit watermark is embedded using CryptoEncryption and CompressDemo at different input sizes.
The increase of program execution time is mainly caused by the exception handling trigger, which is embedded in the loop body. The ''time average'' for each exception can be calculated (increase in time divided by trigger counter in Tables 11 and 12 ), which ranges from 5.2-5.9 us (about 5.5 us). When the length of the watermark is 1024 bits, the number of exception handling embedded in the program is 342. Therefore, if all exceptions avoid to be embedded in the loop, then each exception is only triggered once, and the program execution time increases by about 1.9 ms. To sum up, In the case of maximum embedding of 1024 bits watermark, the increase of the program running time is not obvious. And the experiment shows that the proposed watermarking algorithm does not introduce a large increase in execution time for the program. The algorithm does not significantly affect the performance of the program and possesses good imperceptibility. However, the loop of the program should be avoided as far as the watermark embedding point.
Based on the above two experiments, this paper shows the influence of the watermark embedding on the program size and running time under different watermarking lengths. Although in theory, the algorithm in this paper can embed watermark of any size into the program of various sizes. With the increase of the length of the watermarking, all the effect on program size and running time of embedding will increase, especially in some small programs; and the increase will reduce the imperceptibility of watermark. Therefore, the embedded one also needs to choose the appropriate watermark length according to the performance of the program during the process of using the algorithm, which has achieved a good balance between the watermark capacity and the imperceptibility. 
C. ROBUSTNESS VERIFICATION
To further evaluate the robustness of the algorithm, we use the attack tools ASProtect, Upx, and AsPack to attack the watermarked program and verify the correctness of the extracted watermark. The experimental results are shown in Table 13 . The watermark can still be extracted correctly after attacks of encryption, shelling, and compression of the watermarked programs. The original semantics of the program are still maintained, although different attacks are conducted. Thus, exception handling can still be triggered during the program execution, so the watermark can still be properly maintained.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This study proposes a dynamic software watermarking algorithm based on program exception handling. The algorithm encodes the binary watermark as an exception type sequence, which is embedded into the program source code by building the trigger condition and exception handling code. The watermark has good invisibility due to the common existence of exception handling in programs and the similar features of the embedded and original exception handlers. The embedded exception handlers are closely integrated with the original program code and also run, which enhances the difficulty of removing them. The embedding identification of exception handling also improves the capability of the watermark to resist attacks of code adding and code rearrangement. In the experiment, the implementation of various tools, such as code compression and encryption, verifies the capability of the watermark to resist semantic transformation. In this paper, the algorithm encodes the watermark as exception handing, involved in the program execution directly, and improves the robustness of watermark. The size and running time of the program increase linearly with the length of the watermark at the same time. Therefore, in order to ensure the imperceptibility of watermark, it is difficult to embed mass watermark in the program with smaller file and shorter running time. In addition, the selection of embarking position has effect on the robustness of watermark, which requires watermark embarking one has enough understanding on the original program. Finally, it is important for embedding identification in the embedding exception handling to extract that watermark correctly. So getting more reasonable and effective protection method of the identification is one of the main future research works.
